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
TRADE ISSUES have recently erupted between the United States and China and the battle 
over newly announced tariffs has 
escalated quickly. At the beginning of 
2018, the United States imposed tariffs 
on imported solar panels and washing 
machines, and China responded by 
initiating an anti-dumping investigation 
into US sorghum. In early March, 
President Trump announced steel and 
aluminum tariffs with China being one 
of the primary targets. Within two 
weeks, China responded by announcing 
a list of 128 US products that are the 
targets of retaliatory tariffs effective 
on April 2, 2018. The list included pork 
products and ethanol, which are of 
critical importance to the US Midwest. 
As those tariffs went into effect, the US 
Trade Representative announced 25 
percent tariffs on $50 billion worth of 
Chinese imports, along with investment 
restrictions, and the submission of a 
case to the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) over China’s trade practices 
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(Trump 2018; United States Trade 
Representative 2018). The Chinese 
government responded immediately 
with its own tariff package, targeting 
roughly $50 billion of US imports, 
including the largest agricultural 
import, soybeans. For both the United 
States and China, the $50 billion tariffs 
are scheduled to take effect in a couple 
of months. The volleying may continue 
as President Trump has mentioned the 
possibility of another round of proposed 
tariffs on a list of Chinese imports with 
$100 billion in value (Davis 2018).
The United States exports over 
$24 billion worth of agricultural and 
related products to China every year 
(USDA FAS GATS 2018) and has an 
approximate $13.6 billion trade surplus 
in agriculture. Therefore, it is difϐicult 
to overestimate the importance of the 
US-China agricultural trade relationship. 
Stakeholders in the US agricultural 
industry are nervously speculating 
China’s next move, fearing that the 
already announced tariffs will be put in 
place, as has happened for sorghum and 
pork, and that additional tariffs or other 
trade barriers will be erected. 
China’s Previous Agricultural 
Trade Retaliations 
Tires vs. Chicken 2009: In April 
2009, a trade union ϐiled a complaint 
against China with the United States 
International Trade Commission 
(USITC). The USITC determined that 
some tires from China were being 
imported in quantities or under 
conditions that were causing market 
disruption for domestic producers 
(USITC 2009). In September 2009, 
President Obama announced a tariff 
increase on tires from China, which at 
the time were valued at $2.1 billion 
annually (Andrews 2009). 
China ϐiled a WTO complaint, 
which it ultimately lost, and initiated 
its own anti-dumping investigations 
into US broiler chicken products (The 
Chinese Ministry of Commerce 2009). 
China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOC) 
began their investigation days after 
the US announcement, and a year later 
announced that China would impose 
an anti-dumping tariff on US broiler 
products (AP 2010). The value of broiler 
products exported from the United 
States to China was $800 million in 
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the previous year, which constitutes a 
smaller, but somewhat comparable, trade 
ϐlow to the Chinese tires targeted by the 
United States. 
The US tariff against Chinese tires 
was effective in limiting Chinese exports. 
However, China’s tariff on US broilers 
was even more effective—the value of 
US broiler exports to China dropped 
83 percent from 2009 to 2010 ($660 
million). Soon after, a further round of 
sanctions would decrease US broiler 
exports to China to almost zero. The cost 
to China was rather small. About half 
of the chicken exported to China was in 
the form of chicken feet, which although 
popular in China, is not essential for 
Chinese consumers. Furthermore, 
China was able to shift imports from the 
United States to other countries. Figure 
1 shows that the $511 million decrease 
in imports  from the United States was 
accompanied by a $636 million increase 
in imports from other countries.
Solar panels and washing 
machines vs. sorghum: In January 
2018, after a three-month anti-dumping 
investigation, President Trump approved 
tariffs on solar panels and washing 
machines. Within two weeks, China 
responded by initiating an anti-dumping 
investigation on US sorghum (The 
Chinese Ministry of Commerce 2018). 
As with chickens, China responded 
proportionally by choosing a commodity 
with a smaller, yet comparable, trade 
value ($837 million) relative to the US 
targets ($1.4 billion for solar panels and 
$0.2 billion for washing machines) (UN 
Comtrade 2018). If China does impose an 
import tariff on US sorghum, it is expected 
be signiϐicant—38 percent of the sorghum 
produced in the United States and 81 
percent of total US sorghum exports go 
to China. Although China heavily relies on 
US sorghum (82 percent of imports and 
51 percent of domestic consumption), it 
is mainly used for livestock feed, so there 
are plenty of substitutes such as other 
Figure 1. Chicken trade between the US, China, and the 
rest of the world (ROW).
Sources: USDA FAS GATS, 2018; USDA PSD, 2018; and UN Comtrade, 2018.
Table 1. Summary of Two Chinese Retaliation Cases on US 
Agricultural Exports
Source: Author calculations from USDA FAS GATS, 2018 and UN Comtrade, 2018.
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Figure 2. Sorghum trade between the US, China, and the 
rest of the world (ROW).
Source: USDA FAS GATS, 2018; USDA PSD, 2018; and UN Comtrade, 2018.
coarse grains and corn (Reidy 2018). 
Therefore, the domestic cost to China is 
likely to be small.
What Lessons Can Be Learned from 
China’s Previous Retaliations?
As the two cases above demonstrate, 
China’s approach to trade disputes 
can be summarized in the following 
three principles: First, China tends to 
target agricultural commodities with 
trade ϐlows comparable to US targets 
in order to send a clear message. At the 
same time, China has carefully avoided 
escalation by choosing targets with 
a smaller trade value. Second, China 
choses commodities that are easily 
substitutable across products and 
across sources. The Chinese government 
actively pursues substitutability across 
sources by diversifying the sources of 
agricultural imports. Third, China uses 
retaliatory tariffs to inϐlict economic 
loss on politically inϐluential interest 
groups, in hopes that they will in turn 
put political pressure on the government 
to ease the trade restrictions. China has 
chosen agricultural products as they 
see the affected US producers to be 
politically powerful.
Understanding China’s Recent 
Trade Moves
The three principles discussed 
above do help shed light on China’s 
potential moves. The fact that China 
did not target soybeans as the target of 
retaliation for the steel and aluminum 
tariff is not surprising in light of the 
“proportional response” principle: 
while China exports $2.8 billion of steel 
and aluminum products to the United 
States, it imports more than $12 billion 
in soybeans from the United States. 
Choosing soybeans at that point would 
have been a dramatic escalation and 
deviation from China’s past strategy.
However, for the Trump 
administration’s proposed tariffs on $50 
billion of Chinese imports, a retaliation 
on soybeans had to be on the table as far 
as proportional response is concerned. 
In fact, the total value of US agricultural 
exports to China (including related 
products) is $21 billion. Currently, 
China relies on soybeans from Brazil 
and the United States to supply about 
90 percent of its soybean consumption, 
predominately for feed. The sheer 
volume of the exports makes it more 
difϐicult to displace than other products. 
However, if need be, China could shift 
some signiϐicant share of imports to 
other countries such as Brazil and 
Argentina, and look to replace soybeans 
with other products.
Trade relations worldwide are in 
a period of ϐlux right now. The trade-
dependent US agriculture system has 
been dragged into the trade drama 
before, and unfortunately is being 
targeted again. The tariffs that have 
been imposed and threatened have 
already impacted agricultural markets, 
driving prices lower on the prospects of 
reduced trade ϐlows. However, with the 
delayed implementation of the tariffs 
from the $50 billion announcements on 
both sides, there is some time for trade 
negotiations to reduce or eliminate 
these tariffs. But both sides will need to 
step up to the negotiating table.
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THE US livestock industry has experienced drastic structural changes over the last two 
decades. The industry has shifted 
towards greater specialization across 
production phases, increased reliance 
on off-farm inputs such as feed, and 
increased use of production contracts 
(McBride and Key 2013). One trend 
that is particularly relevant to Iowa 
policymakers, farmers, and rural Iowans 
is the increased prevalence, size, and 
regional intensity of large, enclosed 
hog feeding operations. Where many 
of the largest hog-producing states 
have seen modest increases or even 
declines in total hog inventories over 
time, Iowa has seen a steady increase 
in inventories since 1982 (Figure 1a). 
Within Iowa, production concentrates 
in north-central and northwestern 
counties (Figure 1b). 
These trends are driven by scale 
economies and higher productivity 
of larger, specialized operations. 
Larger facilities, however, can create 
greater environmental risk for nearby 
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communities. For example, larger 
operations generate more manure and 
less available nearby cropland on which 
to spread it. As such, the largest feeding 
operations, known as Concentrated 
Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs), 
are regulated by the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA). In general, 
a hog feeding operation is classiϐied 
as a CAFO if it has at least 2,500 hogs, 
though some smaller operations 
may also be regulated if they are 
nearby water bodies (EPA 2012). As 
with any environmental regulation, 
tradeoffs exist between the cost of 
these regulations to producers and the 
beneϐit to society of reduced pollution. 
In this article, we review the relevant 
regulations facing hog producers in 
Iowa and discuss future research of 
our own that will explore the costs and 
beneϐits of these regulations. 
Iowa’s Hog Industry 
Iowa’s hog industry provides 
tremendous economic beneϐits to the 
state. Hog sales in Iowa exceeded $6.8 
Figure 1: Hog inventories over time and regional concentration 
Source: USDA Census of Agriculture, 1982–2012
billion in 2012, and hog inventories 
in that year were more than double 
those in the second-largest producing 
state, North Carolina (Figure 1a). Not 
surprisingly, Iowa is also the leading 
state in the number of CAFOs. In 
2017, Iowa had around 7,800 feeding 
operations that raised at least 100 hogs. 
Nearly half of those operations (about 
3,000) were CAFOs. (Iowa Geodata 
database https://geodata.iowa.gov).
As Iowa’s industry has grown over, the 
size composition of producers has also 
shifted. Figure 2 shows that despite 
the large growth in hog inventories, 
the number of hog farmers has steadily 
declined since 1992. Meanwhile, 
the proportion of large operations 
increased. In 1982, around 80 percent 
of the state’s hogs were on farms with 
less than 500 head, and only a tiny 
fraction of producers had more than 
2,000 head. Fast forward to 2012, and 
these statistics show a very different 
story. Just under 30 percent of hog 
inventories in Iowa are on farms with 
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less than 500 head, while over 40 
percent of inventories are on farms 
with more than 2,000 head. This shift 
in industry structure is largely driven 
by scale economies (McBride and Key 
2013). Larger, specialized operations 
can producer more hogs at lower costs. 
Larger operations naturally 
generate more waste and can contribute 
to local environmental pollution. In 
2003, the EPA estimated that AFOs in 
the United States produced more than 
500 million tons of manure. When 
applied inappropriately to local lands, 
manure can increase nitrate pollution 
in surface waterways and groundwater. 
Large feeding operations also produce 
local air pollution, emitting ammonia, 
methane, and particulate matter 
that may pose health risks to nearby 
populations (Hribar 2010). Further, 
animal feeding operations emit 
greenhouse gases (including methane, a 
particularly potent greenhouse gas), and 
produce odors that may be unpleasant 
to local and downwind communities. 
Due to these issues, the expansion of the 
hog industry in Iowa has some raised 
concerns from local communities and 
environmental groups who seek better 
regulations to limit adverse impacts of 
the industry. 
Federal Regulation of Animal 
Feeding Operation  
CAFOs are regulated by the US 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
under the Clean Water Act (CWA). The 
most recent regulations were passed 
in 2003 and 2008, which updated and 
strengthened previous CAFOs rules. The 
2003/2008 CAFO rules are examples of 
what economists refer to as ‘size-based’ 
regulation. In general, the CAFO rules 
apply only to animal feeding operations 
that exceed a certain size. When an 
AFO exceeds this threshold, they are 
ofϐicially designated as a CAFO and are 
subject to stringent pollution control 
and permitting requirements. 
While regulatory authority over 
CAFOs ultimately resides with the EPA, 
much of the design and enforcement 
activities of AFOs are delegated to 
states. In Iowa, the Department Natural 
Resources (DNR) enforces most AFO 
standards. Iowa DNR categorizes AFOs 
into two types: conϐinements (totally 
roofed) and open feedlots. Most hog 
operations in the state are conϐined. The 
DNR requires all hog feeding operations 
with greater than 500 animal units 
(roughly 1,250 hogs) to develop a 
manure management plan (MMP) and 
submit annual updates. 
The DNR also created the Master 
Matrix, a scoring system to evaluate the 
siting of conϐinement AFOs. Proposed 
operations in nearly every county in 
Iowa must submit a Master Matrix. 
The form scores proposals based on 
their location (e.g., distance from 
water sources), practices (e.g., covered 
liquid manure storage structures), 
and size. Producers may commit 
to different site characteristics and 
manure management practices to earn 
points. The more points a proposed 
project receives, the fewer impacts the 
operations will be evaluated to have 
on nearby communities as well as 
water and air quality. A proposed site 
is approved for construction only if it 
scores at least 50 percent of the full 
score available and at least 25 percent 
for each of three subcategories (water, 
air, and community impact).
While the master matrix and MMPs 
apply to all but the smallest AFO in the 
state, AFOs face especially stringent 
rules when they fall under the 
purview of the CAFO rules. CAFOs are 
designated  as point-source polluters 
under the CWA. As such, these facilities 
must obtain discharge permits, submit 
comprehensive nutrient management 
plans, and may be required to invest 
in many more mitigating practices to 
ensure they will have limited impacts on 
the local environment.
Figure 2: Iowa Farms with Hogs and Hog-operation Size 
Source: USDA Census of Agriculture, 1982–2012
continued on page 10
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THERE IS a lot of uncertainty in agriculture right now, from the delayed onset of spring and the 
delayed planting that goes with it, to 
the ongoing trade disputes and trade 
agreement renegotiations, agricultural 
producers are adjusting production 
plans to deal with the uncertainty. 
Below is a quick summary of the current 
situation for Iowa’s major agricultural 
commodities, based on the latest reports 
and surveys from USDA. The majority 
of the information for the USDA reports 
was gathered before the latest rounds 
in the US-China trade dispute. However, 
the outlook highlights the importance 
of trade in agriculture and shows the 
avenues where trade will inϐluence 
production and consumption decisions.
Hog Prospects Dim 
A double whammy of rising feed prices 
and falling hog prices point to tighter 
hog margins than were expected earlier 
this year. Projected 2018 proϐits in ISU’s 
farrow-to-ϐinish model dipped from the 
$11 per head forecast in December to 
losses of $4 per head in April. Carcass 
weight prices in 2018 are now expected 
to average near $63 per cwt compared 
to about $66.50 last year. News of 
the Chinese government imposing an 
additional 25 percent duty on imports 
of US pork and pork variety meat adds 
additional volatility to the market.
The national breeding herd is 1.7 
percent larger than a year ago based 
on early March producer surveys for 
USDA’s Hogs and Pigs Report (Table 1). 
Breeding herd additions totaled 21,000 
head from December to March. For the 
March through May quarter, US producers 
intend to farrow 3.078 million sows. 
Intended farrowings for June through 
August, 2018, are up 1.4 percent from 
2017. A big question is if producers back 
Current Situation for Iowa’s Major Ag Commodities
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off on farrowings given the change in the 
proϐitability outlook. A March uptick in 
sow slaughter suggests they might.
Growing pork export demand had 
enabled the US industry to continue 
expanding in recent years. In 2016 and 
2017, rising exports required an average 
annual increase in US production of 
only 2.2 percent per year. In 2018, USDA 
expects pork exports for the year to 
be up 5.2 percent. However, news of 
the Chinese import tariff hike puts a 
negative tilt on export growth in 2018. 
Chinese market uncertainty makes 
expanding and diversifying export 
destinations for pork crucial. New and 
emerging markets in countries such as 
Colombia, the Dominican Republic, and 
Chile, and mainstay markets such as 
Mexico, Japan, and South Korea were 
strong in 2017 and will be counted on 
again this year. With over 40 percent 
of US pork exports going to Mexico and 
Canada, one could argue that a positive 
outcome to NAFTA is the biggest piece of 
the puzzle still in need of certainty. 
Cattle Expansion Continues
USDA’s annual Cattle inventory report 
conϐirmed that beef herd expansion 
continued in 2017, albeit at a slower 
pace than in 2016. Beef herd expansions 
often last for four to six years. The 
current expansion began in 2014 and 
could continue for another year or so. 
If it does, beef production in this cycle 
likely would not peak until early in the 
next decade.
As of January 1, 2018, the US 
inventory of all cattle and calves was 
up 0.7 percent at 94.4 million head 
(Table 2). The beef cow inventory 
increased 1.6 percent. Beef replacement 
heifers were down 3.7 percent. Dairy 
cows were up a slight 0.6 percent and 
dairy replacement heifers were up 0.6 
percent. The feedlot inventory for all 
feedlots rose to 14 million head.
A headline grabber in the report was 
an estimated year-over-year decline of 
607,400 head of feeder cattle outside of 
feedlots. Feeder supply can drop when 
cattle numbers are still rising. The total 
inventory of steers, other heifers, and 
calves was up 0.8 percent. However, large 
feedlot placements in 2017 pulled the 
January 2018 feedlot inventory up 7.2 
percent year-over-year, meaning that more 
2017 crop calves are already in feedlots. If 
realized, the smaller feeder supply could 
be a catalyst that could spur shorter-
term advances in feeder prices, and help 
support deferred-fed cattle prices on the 
presumption that feedlot placements 
in 2018 will be smaller than previously 
expected, leading to lower than expected 
fed beef production later in 2018.
 Replacements remain large in 
absolute number and as a percentage of 
the beef cow herd. Ample replacements 
and the larger January 2018 cow herd 
leave room for the 2018 calf crop to 
expand, suggesting further growth in total 
cattle inventory into 2019. The question 
is whether producers are adjusting their 
intentions. Producers can easily divert 
open replacement heifers into feeder 
markets if their expectations change. Such 
a shift could easily boost feeder cattle 
supply and derail further expansion.
Corn Acreage Slips
For the corn market, the question for 
most of the spring was how farmers 
would adjust their plantings in 2018. 
That question was initially answered 
with the March release of the USDA’s 
Prospective Plantings report. Farmers 
indicated they would reduce corn acreage 
by over two million acres, with most of 
that reduction coming from the Great 
Plains. However, with 88 million acres 
Agricultural Policy Review / 7
still in corn production, the production 
prospects are still quite high. USDA’s 
yield trend estimate stands at 174 
bushels per acre. That would place 
expected production at roughly 14 
billion bushels, on pace to be the fourth-
largest corn crop ever (see Table 3). So 
large supplies remain an issue.
Corn usage (gray box, Table 3) is 
projected to diminish slightly. The slight 
drop in feed and residual use is mainly 
in the residual category as the livestock 
herd expansion continues. Corn usage 
for ethanol continues to grow as both 
domestic and international ethanol 
Table 1. USDA Quarterly Hogs and Pigs Report Summary
Notes: * 1,000 head; **1,000 litters; 1December preceding year; 2Intentions
Table 2. Cattle Inventory by Class and Calf Crop
Note: * 1,000 head, ** 2016 and 2017
Source: USDA-NASS
use expands. Exports are the area 
where the biggest setback is expected, 
and these numbers were set before 
the latest tariff announcements. 
While China is not a key market for 
US corn, Mexico is and the NAFTA 
renegotiations are critical for this 
market. Global corn supplies are also 
at very high levels, so competition in 
the corn trade market was expected. 
However, recent projections for the 
South American corn crops point to 
smaller crops due to a combination of 
drought in Argentina and a reduction 
in second-crop corn acres in Brazil.
Soybean Acreage Sinks As Well
The biggest shakeup for the crop 
markets from the Prospective Plantings 
report came from soybeans. Throughout 
March, the soybean market had been 
preparing for an announcement of 
a record number of acres planted to 
soybeans, exceeding corn for the ϐirst 
time since 1983. Well, the second 
part of that statement happened, but 
not the ϐirst. Farmers indicated they 
would plant oen million fewer acres 
to soybeans (but the total still exceeds 
corn). However, like with corn, projected 
continued on page 11
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RURAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP can help stimulate local economies by creating local jobs 
and providing goods and services that 
improve the quality of life of nearby 
residents. However, as Reynolds et 
al. (1995) note, rural entrepreneurs 
can face difϐiculties through lack 
of sufϐicient capital, infrastructure, 
and access to educated labor. These 
hardships often result in lower ϐirm 
entry rates when compared to urban 
areas and businesses characterized 
as low-income and low-growth. This 
leads to the common notion that rural 
entrepreneurship is necessity driven—
entrepreneurs create rural businesses 
in order to remain in, or relocate 
to, a rural location (Tosterud and 
Habbershon 1992).
Recent research, however, has 
shown that the factors that affect 
rural business location also increase 
the likelihood that business will 
survive (Artz, Guo, and Orazem 2015), 
suggesting that rural entrepreneurs 
possess location-speciϐic capital that 
increases the probability of becoming an 
entrepreneur and offers greater returns 
relative to being a wage earner. In order 
to fully analyze and understand the 
location choices of entrepreneurs, we 
analyze survey results from 4,448 Iowa 
State University alumni who graduated 
between 1982 and 2007. Furthermore, 
we assess returns to location-speciϐic 
human capital by location and the 
relative earnings of rural and urban wage 
earners and entrepreneurs. 
Our research shows that alumni 
that live in a rural location are more 
likely to become entrepreneurs than 
their urban counterparts, and that rural 
entrepreneurs earn more than rural 
wage workers and earn roughly the 
same as urban entrepreneurs. 
Entrepreneurship choice
While there are many factors that 
inϐluence the choice to become an 
entrepreneur, two factors—education 
and family background—have the 
largest impact. Educational attainment 
provides some of the necessary skills 
to become a successful business owner 
(Bates 1990); however, there is a tipping 
point, as there is evidence suggesting 
that earning an advanced degree (MS, 
Ph.D., etc.) may actually lower the 
likelihood of becoming an entrepreneur 
(Matthews and Human 2004).
Familial background can inϐluence 
entrepreneurial decisions as well, as 
Matthews and Human (2004) show, 
entrepreneurial parents can impart 
their offspring with the necessary skills 
and may be willing to transfer ϐinancial 
wealth to their offspring. 
When examining the earning 
potential of entrepreneurs, Hamilton 
(2000) finds that entrepreneurship 
doesn’t pay—the self-employed seem 
to earn about 25 percent less over the 
course of 25 years than a wage worker 
of similar skill level. The assumption 
is that entrepreneurs are willing to 
accept a lower rate of pay for the 
non-financial benefits associated with 
being self-employed.
Rural Location Choice
Numerous factors must be accounted 
for when examining the likelihood of 
choosing to reside in a rural location. 
Education, labor markets, age, marital 
status, and the presence of children 
are all considered important factors 
in location choice. Even among those 
born in rural areas, educational 
attainment has been shown to reduce 
the likelihood of choosing to reside 
in a rural areas (Mills and Hazarika 
2002). Unlike the choice to become 
an entrepreneur, there is no tipping 
point in education—those with higher 
education levels are less likely to reside 
in a rural area. While we would expect 
those born in a rural location would 
be more likely to reside and operate a 
business in a rural area, the evidence 
does not support that hypothesis.
Graves (1979) ϐinds that for adults 
in their 30s and 40s quality of life and 
family issues are factors that heavily 
inϐluence location choice—they are 
more likely to choose areas that have 
lower crime rates, more affordable 
housing, and lower population 
densities. However, rural labor markets 
are usually considered “thin” and the 
return on educational investment is 
lower in rural areas than in urban areas. 
Does Rural Entrepreneurship Pay?
Li Yu and Georgeanne Artz 
gartz@iastate.edu
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Location-specifi c Capital
Location-speciϐic capital—an asset 
accumulated over time from living in a 
speciϐic place—is an important factor in 
choosing not only self-employment, but 
where to locate a business. Location-
speciϐic capital can be advantageous 
to new rural businesses through 
knowledge of local resources and needs 
and local social networks that provide 
access to credit, customers, suppliers, 
and information.
Despite Mills and Hazarika’s 
(2002) ϐinding that educational 
attainment reduces the likelihood of 
residing in a rural area, even for the 
rural-born, previous research (Artz 
and Yu 2011) shows that growing up 
in a rural area is the most signiϐicant 
predictor of choosing a rural residence 
after college. 
Data
The data in our analysis was taken from 
a 2007 survey of Iowa State University 
alumni that graduated with a bachelor’s 
degree between 1982 and 2006. Surveys 
were sent to a random selection of the 
84,917 alumni that graduated with a 
bachelor’s degree in that time. Ultimately, 
we received 4,448 usable observations.
Our data show that 34 percent of our 
respondents were raised in a rural area, 
but only 13 percent currently resided 
in a rural area. Though the majority of 
alumni raised in a rural area had moved 
to an urban area, respondents that were 
raised in a rural area were more likely to 
reside in a rural area than those raised in 
an urban area. The proportion of alumni 
that were raised in rural and urban areas 
and became entrepreneurs was roughly 
equal—approximately 11 percent for 
each group; however, roughly 45 percent 
of rural-raised entrepreneurs located 
their business in a rural area, compared 
to only 14 percent of urban-raised 
entrepreneurs.
Our data also show that urban 
residents earn nearly 40 percent 
more than rural residents, though 
this statistic wasn’t adjusted for cost 
of living.
Results
The results of our survey reveal many 
of the contributing factors that lead 
to becoming self-employed and those 
that lead to living in a rural area. 
Having grown up in a rural area does 
not impact the likelihood of becoming 
an entrepreneur; however, it does 
positively impact the likelihood of 
living in a rural location after college 
graduation. Graduates of the College 
of Agriculture and Life Sciences are 
more likely to live in a rural location 
and become an entrepreneur than are 
graduates of the College of Liberal 
Arts and Sciences. 
Older alumni, married alumni, 
alumni raised by entrepreneurial 
parents, and alumni with an 
advanced professional degree (i.e., 
law degree, medical degree) or 
that graduated from the College of 
Design are all more likely to become 
entrepreneurs, though many from 
these groups are less likely to reside 
in a rural area. 
Individuals with a more 
diversified work experience are 
more likely to live in a rural area 
and become entrepreneurs. Also, 
individuals that grew up in a rural 
area and return to their home state 
are more likely to become a rural 
entrepreneur; however, those that 
grew up in a rural area and don’t 
return to their home state are less 
likely to become a rural entrepreneur. 
The positive relationship between 
rural origin and entrepreneurship for 
returned individuals confirms that 
location-specific capital is important 
to rural entrepreneurship.
 
Why are rural location and 
entrepreneurship associated?
We ϐind two likely reasons that rural 
entrepreneurship and rural location may 
be associated with each other. The ϐirst 
reason is that rural residents are more 
likely to start a business because of the 
thin labor market for wage labor. The 
second reason is that rural locations are 
a good match for some entrepreneurs, 
consistent with the idea of location-
speciϐic capital—some entrepreneurs 
have a productivity advantage due to 
region-speciϐic knowledge and local 
social networks that make access to 
things such as credit, suppliers, and 
customers more accessible. 
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Figure 3. Iowa hog-operation size and CAFO limits 
Source: Iowa Department of Natural Resources 1982–2012)
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Hog Feeding Operations
continued from page 5
 
Research Questions 
Moving Forward
The federal government spends tens 
of billions of dollars annually on 
clean water programs (Keiser 2017). 
Despite its substantial contributions 
to poor water quality in the United 
States, the agricultural sector is largely 
unregulated by existing federal CWA 
rules. One of the few exceptions is 
animal feeding operations, making 
the sector particularly interesting to 
environmental economists. 
A fundamental economic principle 
is that the efϐicient level of production 
in any industry occurs where, on the 
margin, private and public production 
costs equal the beneϐits of additional 
production. In our setting, that means 
that the efϐicient size of hog feeding 
operations weighs the beneϐit of 
additional hog production against 
both the additional cost of raising and 
feeding hogs and the additional cost to 
local communities (and society more 
broadly) of increasing an operation’s 
size. Left alone, markets will not 
internalize this second category of 
costs, leaving room for regulation to 
improve market outcomes. 
Thus, from an economic 
perspective, the question is not whether 
environmental regulations of feeding 
operations could beneϐit society, but 
(a) what types of regulations are most 
efϐicient; and (b) whether less efϐicient 
policies still beneϐit society. Size-based 
regulations are inefϐicient ways to 
regulate most polluting industries. Thus, 
the focus of our future research relates to 
this second class of questions. Speciϐically, 
we will work on quantifying CAFO 
regulations’ effects on environmental 
outcomes and weigh them against the 
costs of these regulations to producers. 

Agricultural Policy Review / 11
Preliminary evidence suggests 
that these regulations have a large 
impact on producers. This is best 
evidenced by Figure 3. Here, we graph 
the distribution of AFO sizes in Iowa 
using recent data from the DNR. The 
red vertical line corresponds to the 
CAFO limit. Immediately apparent is 
that many producers avoid regulation 
by limiting their size to be just below 
the CAFO threshold. While this is not a 
new ϐinding (see, e.g., Sneeringer and 
Key 2011), many questions remain 
as to the implications of this strategic 
avoidance. For example, how much 
do CAFO regulations beneϐit the local 
environment? How do these beneϐits 
compare to producer costs of meeting 
CWA requirements?  Are there other 
implications for industry productivity 
and structure due to the adverse 
incentives created by the CAFO rules? 
We will explore these questions and 
more in future APR articles. 
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production is still quite large. The 4.27 
billion bushels would be the third-
largest soybean crop, following the 
record crop from last year and the bin-
buster from 2016 (see Table 4).
 USDA’s early projections for 2018 
soybean usage will likely face some 
major revisions given the trade dispute. 
While domestic usage is expected to 
continue to grow this year, exports 
were the major vehicle for the growth 
in USDA’s usage projections. As Table 
4 shows, USDA had projected a strong 
rebound in soybean exports, mainly 
driven by China. As China represents 
roughly 60 percent of that export 
total, the tariff announcements cast a 
long shadow over these projections. 
A 25 percent tariff would be a major 
impediment for US soybeans to 
overcome and any slowdown in the 
ϐlow of soybeans will create issues for 
the market. While other markets would 
grow to absorb some of the Chinese 
allocation, it is highly unlikely that the 
combined growth would match the loss 
in the Chinese market. 
Table 3. US Corn Balance Sheet
Source: USDA-WAOB
Table 4. US Soybean Balance Sheet 
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COVER CROPS, which are planted on approximately 700,000 of Iowa’s 30 million acres of farmland, 
have been found to have varying net 
returns based on several factors—
cover crop species, planting technique, 
termination method, tillage practices, 
following cash crop, and the farmer’s 
years of experience with cover crops.
Farmers that don’t use cover crops 
for grazing livestock or forage tended 
to consistently derive negative returns. 
Farmers that used cover crops for 
grazing livestock or forage and received 
cost-share payments tended to see 
positive net returns.
The full ϐindings are detailed in the 
working paper “Annual Net Returns to 
Cover Crops in Iowa.” The study was 
funded by NCR-SARE and the Center for 
Agricultural and Rural Development at 
Iowa State University.
The data in the working paper 
are based on a subset of survey 
respondents that reported planting 
cover crops on some, but not all, of 
their acres in 2015 and planting the 
same cash crop in 2016 in acres where 
they did and did not use cover crops. 
Farmer’s production system expenses 
and revenues were then identiϐied, 
monetized, and compared when they 
did and did not use cover crops.
Cover crops can induce revenue 
and expense changes in a farmer’s 
production system in several ways. 
Revenue can be affected by savings 
in livestock feed costs due to cover 
crop grazing, changes in cash crop 
production values following cover crop 
plantings, and cost-share payments 
that can partially offset the cost of 
cover crops. Expense changes due to 
cover crops can be broken down into 
planting, termination, and other costs. 
Planting costs include seed purchases, 
differential planting method costs, 
and labor. Termination costs typically 
include herbicide purchases, spraying, 
and labor. Some of the other costs that 
might change when using cover crops 
include costs to repair soil erosion, 
fertilizer and insecticide costs, cash 
crop seed costs, and changes in cash 
rent due to cover crop use.
Net returns to cover crops 
terminated with herbicides
When examining cover crops 
terminated with herbicides, net returns 
were found to be positive, $8.59 and 
$14.25 per acre for corn and soybeans, 
respectively. However, net returns 
became negative when farmers didn’t 
utilize cover crops as livestock feed or 
received cost-share payments. When 
excluding those two factors, farmers 
that terminated cover crops with 
herbicide faced negative net returns 
of $48.82 per acre and $38.42 per acre 
when cover crops were followed by 
corn and soybeans, respectively.
Net returns based on years 
of experience
Farmers were placed into three 
categories based on their experience 
with cover crops: 3 years or less, 4–9 
years, and 10 or more years. More 
experienced farmers reported a 
smaller yield drag in corn production 
than less experienced farmers, and the 
most experienced farmers reported a 
corn yield bump following cover crops. 
When cover crops were followed with 
corn and not used for livestock feed 
and cost-share payments were not 
received, negative net returns were 
realized—$57.95, $43.19, and $31.97 
per acre, respectively. Yield drag in 
soybean production due to cover 
crops was less of an issue than in corn 
production, but the most experienced 
group showed the largest yield drag. 
When cover crops were followed with 
soybeans and not used for livestock 
feed and cost-share payments were not 
received, all three experience groups 
saw negative net returns—$39.36, 
$34.33, and $36.79 per acre, 
respectively.
Net returns to cereal rye followed 
by corn by tillage practice
When examining cereal rye followed 
by corn, every tillage practice—no-
till, reduced-till, and conventional- or 
vertical-till—produced negative net 
returns, despite the similar planting 
costs, when livestock feed savings and 
cost-share payments were not utilized. 
Farmers in these conditions saw 
negative net returns of $30.34, $53.41, 
and $69.23 per acre for reduced-till, 
no-till, and conventional-till operations, 
respectively.
Net returns to cover crops by 
planting method in no-till systems
Excluding feed cost savings and cost 
share payments in no-till systems, 
farmers that followed drill-planted 
cover crops with corn saw a negative 
net return of $54.09 per acre; and 
farmers that followed aerial seeding of 
cover crops with corn saw a negative 
net return of $53.73 per acre. When 
following cover crops with soybeans, 
farmers that used aerial seeding saw a 
negative net return of $34.12 per acre, 
whereas farmers using drill-planting saw 
a negative net return of $34.65 per acre.
Do Cover Crops Pay? Net Returns to 
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Net returns to cover crops 
by termination method
Farmers that used tillage to terminate 
cover crops saw a negative net return of 
$29.94 per acre; and farmers that used 
herbicide as the termination method 
saw a negative net return of $53.55 
per acre. These ϐindings are valid 
for conventional-till operations that 
used drill planting of cover crops and 
followed with corn, excluding feed cost 
savings and cost-share payments.
How do you make cover crops pay?
These results suggest that economic 
returns are a major stumbling block for 
widespread adoption of cover crops in 
Iowa. The lack of market valuations for 
actual soil health indicators prevents 
the incorporation of long-term beneϐits 
into the calculation. Potential measures 
to improve the economic viability 
of cover crops without increasing 
government transfers to cover croppers 
include: (a) developing of a more 
competitive market for cover crop 
seeds; (b) promoting the use of cover 
crops for grazing livestock or forage; 
and, (c) developing and promoting 
location-speciϐic best management 
practices particularly focused on 
minimizing yield drag and containing 
planting and termination costs.
The full reports on the economics 
of cover crops for Iowa and the 
Midwest region are available at: 
www.card.iastate.edu/conservation/
economics-of-cover-crops/. 
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